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Semantic change does not have to be viewed as a linear and historical phenomenon. Meaning 
is dynamic by its very nature and semantic variability can be primarily traced in synchronic 
pragmatic processes such as inferencing. The aim of the following study is to illustrate the 
thesis that without interactionally-induced and cognitively-motivated polysemy one cannot 
account for the fine-grained step-by-step developments that are attested by detailed analyses of 
texts and contexts over time. The semantic developments presented here seem to show that 
semantic change is embedded in larger contextual units such as sentence, text or discourse 
rather than being lexically-confined. From this perspective, the semantic change itself appears 
as a multi-directional and pragmatically conditioned meaning configuration. 
KEYWORDS: diachronic semantics, cognitive linguistics, pragmatic negotiation. 
 
EL PAPEL DE LAS INFERENCIAS PRAGMÁTICAS EN EL PROCESO DE CAMBIO 
SEMÁNTICO 
RESUMEN 
El cambio semántico no debe concebirse como un fenómeno histórico y lineal. El significado 
es dinámico por naturaleza y la variación semántica puede trazarse en primera instancia como 
un proceso pragmático sincrónico basado en inferencias. El propósito del presente estudio es 
ilustrar la tesis de que sin una polisemia inducida interactivamente y motivada cognitivamente 
no se puede llevar a cabo un análisis paso a paso de los desarrollos semánticos que se 
documentan gracias a análisis detallados de textos y contextos a lo largo del tiempo. Las 
evoluciones semánticas presentadas aquí parecen mostrar que el cambio semántico está más 
relacionado con unidades contextuales como la oración, el texto o el discurso que con un 
contenido léxico bien definido. Desde esta perspectiva, el cambio semántico se puede entender 
como un fenómeno multidireccional y pragmáticamente configurado. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: semántica diacrónica, lingüística cognitiva, negociación pragmàtica. 
 
 
1. SEMANTIC CHANGE AS A RESULT OF CONTEXTUALISATION AND MEANING 
NEGOTIATION 
In diachronic semantics, semantic change is traditionally regarded as a 
historical and lexically-bound process. The consequences of semantic change 
can be observed from the historical perspective as a linear progression of sense 
substitutions. We generally associate semantic change with etymology where 
one, remote in time, lexical meaning follows another. In reality, however, any 
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change in meaning takes place at a synchronic level and its causes cannot be 
confined to the limits of a single lexical item. The causes of semantic change are 
always context-induced and cognitively motivated rather than purely 
linguistically encoded. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1985: 300) claims that “in 
the course of ongoing interaction meaning is negotiated, i.e. jointly and 
collaboratively constructed” and this pragmatic process results in semantic 
variability and change. Therefore, the study of semantic change must take into 
consideration the pragmatic conditioning with the beliefs and inferences about 
the nature of the assumptions made by participants and the purposes for which 
utterances are used in the context of communicative language use. 
Unfortunately, the exact contexts of situation, in which semantic shifts occurred 
many years ago, may be very difficult to reconstruct.  
Under this proposal, the semantic content of a lexical item is not perceived 
as fixed and independent of pragmatic inference; but rather, pragmatic 
inference determines an utterance’s semantic content and results in various 
kinds of meaning contextualisations at the lexical level. Thus, semantic change 
originates as a semantic extension in the process of polysemisation and with 
time the ties between the core and periphery become loosened leading to a 
situation where a new meaning loses all associative links with the term from 
which it had been derived.1 As illustrated in Grygiel (2004, 2008, 2012), the 
whole process takes place very smoothly without abrupt leaps and demarcation 
lines between intermediary stages which, in fact, cannot be precisely delimited. 
Very often the various stages coexist at the same time as the diffusion of a 
change runs not only along the temporal axis but also has a spatial and social 
dimension of propagation. Since polysemy is typically the intermediate step in 
semantic change, the same regularities observable in polysemy can be extended 
to the analysis of semantic change. 
The meaning conveyed directly by linguistic form is only a tip of an 
iceberg of underlying information structure that lies beneath the surface of the 
meaning expressed by a sentence or the so called proposition (Lambrecht 1994, 
Fauconnier 1997). Classic examples of this phenomenon are the indirectly 
conveyed presuppositions, entailments and inferences. All of them seem to rely 
on the commonsense reasoning of our daily existence and serve to construct the 
simple meanings of everyday life. They are used to create meaning that makes 
an impression of straightforwardly contained in language, but it fact, the actual 
pragmatic meaning conveyed in the act of communication, exceeds the overt 
information that a language form could carry. From this perspective, the 
                                                             
1 It is important to note that for Bréal, who first introduced the term polysemy in 1897 in his 
fundamental Essai de sémantique, polysemy arises as a consequence of semantic change. Bréal 
(1897) claims that polysemy is the synchronic side of lexical semantic change and can show 
different facets according to the kind of semantic relation between the old sense and the new 
one which is derived from this older sense (see also Fritz 1998:57). 
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phenomenon of semantic change can be understood as the gap between what is 
literally expressed by the linguistic form and the rich layers of understatements 
and connotations evoked by numerous presuppositions, entailments and other 
types of inferences. 
 
2. INFERENCES 
Pragmatic inferencing is the process of reaching a conclusion from known facts 
or evidence. Thus, inferences are logical conclusions based on observations and 
prior knowledge. They are only indirectly triggered by explicit language 
structures (Levinson 1983: 182). According to this definition, both 
presuppositions and entailments are instances of inferences. The problem of 
inferences in natural language has a long history, originating in the syllogisms 
of Aristotle and continuing through the medieval scholastics and the work of 
Leibniz.  
Gricean theories of pragmatics posit that the interpretation of an 
expression is not necessarily identical to its semantic content. Rather, this 
semantic content plays a specific role in the derivation of the expression’s 
interpretation. Gricean pragmatic accounts thus factor the interpretation of an 
expression into two parts: its semantic content, which determines its literal 
meaning, and cooperative social reasoning, which builds on this literal 
interpretation to determine the expression’s inferred meaning. According to 
Geis (1982: 46), “human beings are ‘inferencing’ creatures, trained to ‘read into’ 
what is said as much as is consistent with the literal meaning of what is said 
and the context in which it is said”. Pragmatics is thus the study of how more is 
communicated than is actually said. Listeners make inferences about what is 
linguistically expressed in order to arrive at an interpretation of the speaker’s 
intended meaning. The choice of one type of referring expression rather than 
another seems to be based on what the speaker assumes the listener already 
knows.  
In text linguistics, inferencing is connecting prior knowledge to text based 
information to create meaning beyond what is directly stated. Thus, It is the 
process of creating personal meaning from text. Inferencing involves a mental 
process of combining what is read with relevant prior knowledge 
(schema/background knowledge). As a result of inferencing, the reader’s 
unique interpretation of text is the product of this blending (Graesser et al. 
2001). When readers infer, they create a meaning that is not necessarily stated 
explicitly in the text. The process implies that readers actively search for, or are 
aware of, implicit meaning.  
Another account of the phenomenon of inferencing comes from Relevance 
Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986), which assumes that the interpretation of an 
utterance can be inferentially enriched in order to better capture the speaker’s 
intention. Sperber and Wilson (1986) propose that verbal communication 
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involves both coding and inferential processes. According to the code model, 
communication is achieved by encoding and decoding messages, while in the 
inferential model, it is achieved by producing and interpreting evidence. 
Inferential and decoding processes are quite different. An inferential process 
starts from a set of premises and results in a set of conclusions, which follow 
logically from, or at least warranted by, the premises. A decoding process starts 
from a signal and results in the recovery of a message, which is associated to the 
signal by an underlying code. In general, conclusions are not associated to their 
premises by a code, and signals do not warrant the messages they convey 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986: 13). 
 
 
3. INFERENCES IN SEMANTIC CHANGE 
The pragmatic approach to the study of semantic change is mainly based on 
Grice and NeoGricean pragmatics (Levinson 2000). To a large extent, it 
continues contextual and functional works from the end of the 19th century 
(Grygiel and Kleparski 2007). Among other things, it introduces an aspect of 
language use, namely that speakers of natural languages use inferences in 
communication. The approach is mainly characterised as a cognitive model of 
pragmatics because its mechanism involves processes of reasoning, mental 
projection, association, focussing on salient issues and inferencing. The key 
notion of inferencing amounts to saying that the word develops an additional 
meaning referring to a concept that the original use of the word strongly 
implied. As a consequence, change does not originate within language, but in 
language use, that is in pragmatic factors external to language structure 
(Traugott and Dasher 2002). 
The so-called Invited Inferencing Theory of Semantic Change (henceforth: 
IITSC) was formulated and developed by Elizabeth Traugott in a number of 
publications that appeared in the 1980s and 1990s (Traugott 1989, Traugott and 
König 1991, Traugott 1999, Traugott and Dasher 2002, Traugott 2004). Relying 
on the functional and contextual tradition, Traugott develops the widely 
recognised hypothesis that the chief driving force in the processes of semantic 
change, which she believes are regular, is pragmatics. It is understood that in 
the process of communication different pragmatic meanings may become 
salient in different communities. To a large extent, such differences depend on 
the context in which the new meanings are primarily exploited. The prime 
objective of IITSC is to account for the conventionalisation of pragmatic 
meanings and their reanalysis as semantic meanings. Inferences that arise in 
specific contexts can come to be reanalysed as part of the conventional meaning 
associated with a given construction. Inferences of this kind are invited in the 
sense that they are frequently suggested by the context. 
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According to Traugott’s IITSC, the process of semantic change begins 
when a linguistic unit, used in a specific context, gives rise to an invited 
inference. An invited inference is a ‘particularized conversational implicature’, 
i.e. a communicated proposition whose meaning is context-dependent rather 
than derived directly from the encoded information in the utterance/text. An 
important characteristic of invited inferences is that they “are not stably 
associated with any linguistic form” (Traugott 2004: 547). The invited inferences 
that contribute to semantic change arise when the speaker/writer formulates 
his/her utterance/text in such a way that the addressee/reader feels invited to 
draw a particular inference, thereby ensuring that what is implied is 
understood as being part of what is communicated. 
If a construction gives rise to the same invited inference often enough in a 
specific kind of context, it may become a generalized invited inference. As these 
inferences become “widely understood, and often exploited” (Traugott and 
Dasher 2002: 33), they may become conventionalized, and the inference 
formerly associated with a particular word will become part of its encoded 
meaning, or semantics. At this point, the pragmatically adjusted lexical item 
may be ambiguous between its original meaning and the newly developed 
meaning, or the original meaning may eventually be lost. In either case, when 
the new meaning is recovered, it is no longer cancellable and a semantic change 
becomes permanent. Thus, lexical adjustment may be a one-off process, used 
once and then forgotten, creating an ad hoc concept tied to a particular context 
that may never occur again. However, some of these pragmatically constructed 
senses may catch on in the communicative interactions of a few people or a 
group, and so become regularly and frequently used. In such cases, the 
pragmatic process of concept construction becomes progressively more 
conventionalized, and may ultimately spread through a speech community and 
stabilize as an extra lexical sense.   
As a result of invited inferences, the meanings of words are frequently 
pragmatically adjusted and fine-tuned in context, so that their contribution to 
the proposition expressed is different from their lexically encoded sense. Well-
known examples include lexical narrowing (e.g. drink used to designate 
‘alcoholic drink’), widening (e.g. Kleenex used in the sense of ‘soft facial tissue’) 
and metaphorical extension (e.g. bulldozer used to mean ‘forceful person’).2 
It follows that semantic change can only arise in the process of speaker-
hearer interaction and is thus always the result of context-dependent alteration 
of usage. According to the principles of the IITSC, the speaker does the work of 
innovation but rather invites the hearer to infer his/her motivations behind the 
altered usage from context. One may speak of two interacting and inseparable 
levels to the communicative process, that is a linguistic level and pragmatic 
                                                             
2 For more examples of lexical narrowing and widening in the history of English see Grygiel 
and Kleparski (2007). 
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level. On the linguistic level, the speaker faces the question of which 
expressions have the semantic structure appropriate for conveying the ideas 
that he/she wishes to communicate. On the pragmatic level, the language user 
decides which expression is the best for his/her communicative purposes. When 
none of the conventional semantic structures are deemed appropriate, the 
speaker resorts to the modification of these structures – most of the time 
unconsciously. Thus, with regard to the communicative process, ways of novel 
usage, such as metonymy and metaphor for example, are merely pragmatic 
devices for altering usage within a conventionalised system. 
Traugott (1989) reviews a range of instances of semantic change which she 
identifies as increases in expressed subjectivity, stemming from an 
informativeness strengthening inference, including developments in the 
English modals shall, must and will, speech act verbs such as insist and suggest, 
and adverbs such as probably, apparently and evidently. Observing that the 
semantic developments of these lexical items increase “coding of speaker 
informativeness about his or her attitude” (Traugott 1989:49), the author 
attributes the changes to the process of conventionalisation of implicatures, 
which strengthen both relevance and informativeness. 
In addition, the model proposed by the author provides a partial 
explanation for the widespread regularities that occur in semantic change. They 
include development of meanings from 1) clause-internal to clausal and then 
sentential scope, 2) referential, truth-conditional, or ‘content’ to non-referential 
(‘procedural’) meanings, 3) relatively objective to subjective and then 
intersubjective meanings, 4) non-linguistic to linguistic meanings. The body of 
illustrative examples includes the development of epistemic modals, for 
example must (< ‘be fitting’), discourse markers, for example actually (< manner 
adverb 'effectively'), performative uses of verbs, for example promise (< Lat. pro 
‘forward’ + mis- ‘sent’). 
 
 
4. A RELEVANCE THEORY PERSPECTIVE ON SEMANTIC CHANGE 
 
An alternative account of semantic change by means of inferencing is offered in 
Relevance Theory. Relevance Theory questions the need for a separate category 
of generalized conversational implicature, and instead distinguishes 
conversational implicatures from inferences, which contribute to explicatures, 
i.e. propositions derived from the linguistic meaning of an utterance through a 
process of pragmatic enrichment. Relevance-theoretic accounts of semantic 
change focus on the inferential processes of utterance interpretation, with a 
consequent emphasis on the role of the addressee rather than the speaker 
(Nicolle 2011). Relevance Theory treats lexical narrowing and broadening, like 
utterance interpretation in general, as guided by expectations of relevance. 
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Relevance is defined as a property of utterances and other inputs to cognitive 
processes (e.g. external stimuli such as sights and sounds, and internal 
representations such as thoughts, memories or conclusions of inferences). An 
input is relevant to an individual when it connects with available contextual 
assumptions to yield positive cognitive effects (e.g. true contextual implications, 
warranted strengthening or revisions of existing assumptions). Both narrowing 
and broadening emerge as by-products of the search for relevance, and the 
same encoded concept may be narrowed or broadened (or both) to different 
degrees and in different ways across different occasions of use. 
A concept related to invited inferencing is ‘context-induced 
reinterpretation’ (e.g. Heine et al. 1991). As the term suggests, on this view more 
attention is paid to outcomes of change (reinterpretation) than to onsets of 
semantic change, and to the hearer than to the speaker. Heine, et al. (1991) 
discuss a number of semantic changes that seem to exhibit the same pattern – 
accumulated shifts in meaning, initially inferential, may emerge as 
metaphorical shifts when they cross the boundaries of conceptual domains.  
This is illustrated with the development of the Ewe noun ví ‘(human) child’ into 
a suffix with various senses emerging in different contexts.3 The cognitive 
concept CHILD contains, among others, the features YOUNG, SMALL and 
DESCENDANT OF, each of which may become the most salient content of the 
word child in different contexts of use, as illustrated in the following sentences: 
1) If he was born in 1905, then he was still a child when the war began. YOUNG 
2) This is a child’s cello. SMALL 
3) She is their only child. DESCENDANT OF 
 
The Ewe examples given below, taken from Heine, et al. (1991), aim to 
show how these inferable peripheral senses may give rise to new conventional 
meanings in particular contexts of compounding or affixation. 
YOUNG 
nútsu ‘man’ – nútsu-ví ‘boy’, 
ny•nu ‘woman’ – ny nu-ví ‘girl’, 
nyi ‘cow’ – nyi-ví ‘calf’, 
detí ‘oilpalm tree’  – detí-ví ‘young oilpalm tree’. 
 
YOUNG > INEXPERIENCED 
núfíálá ‘teacher’ – núfíálá-ví ‘one who has just started teaching’, 
 
INEXPERIENCED > APPRENTICE 
d y lá ‘healer’ – d y lá-ví ‘assistant or apprentice to healer’, 
                                                             
3 Ewe is a Niger-Congo language spoken in West Africa (Ghana, Togo and Benin) in the so 
called Eweland which used to be part of the former Slave Region. 
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APPRENTICE > UNQUALIFIED 
búkulá ‘driver' – Búkulá-ví ‘driver who has not passed license test’, 
 
UNQUALIFIED > UNSUCCESSFUL, WANNABE 




x ‘house’ – x -ví ‘small house, hut’, 
la ‘animal – la-ví ‘small animal species’, 
akpa ‘fish’ – akpa-ví ‘small fish species’. 
 
SMALL > WEAK, INSIGNIFICANT 
gbe ‘voice’ – gbe-ví ‘weak, faint voice’, 
ya ‘wind’ – ya-ví ‘light wind, breeze’ 
 
SMALL > COMPONENT, PART OF 
núnono ‘drinking – núnono-ví ‘mouthful of liquid’ 
 
Apparently, chains of meaning shifts such as ‘child’ > ‘young’ > 
‘inexperienced’ > ‘apprentice’ > ‘unqualified’ > ‘unsuccessful’ and ‘child’ > 
‘small’ > ‘component, part of’ are all composed of tiny inferential steps 
plausibly attributed to implicature. Note that ultimately they can be classed as 
metonymic inferences, so long as properties shared by a conceptual entity, or 
elements co-occurring in a conceptual schema, can be classed as contiguous. 
Moreover, such shifts appear to be metonymic in that sense substitution is 
involved. For example, the –ví suffix meaning either ‘young’ or ‘small’ is not 
required to denote a human, unlike the original word. Heine, et al. (1991) 
identify the individual steps in the chain as metonymic, but apparently on the 
grounds, adopted directly from Traugott and König (1991), that implicature is 
metonymic, and not on the grounds of substitution of contiguous senses. More 
distant links in a chain such as ‘child’: ‘unqualified’ or ‘child’: ‘component, part 
of’ appear to be analogically related and taken in isolation, present as 
metaphors. Accordingly, Heine, et al. (1991) propose that implicature/inference 
and metonymy operate at the microlevel of change, producing over time what 
they term ‘emerging metaphors’ at the macrolevel. 
 
 
5. PRAGMATIC INFERENCING IN THE CASE OF THE SEMANTIC CHANGE MAN/MALE 
HUMAN BEING >< HUSBAND/MALE SPOUSE 
It seems that most words for ‘man’ can be also used in the sense of ‘husband’ 
and vice versa. Both meanings co-exist at the synchronic level and their use can 
be only determined by context or a kind of tacit negotiation between the 
speakers during the course of interaction. Similarly, as shown in Grygiel (2008), 
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various historical near-synonyms of man have acquired at some point of their 
semantic evolution the sense ‘husband’. In English, the process can be observed 
in the sense alterations of lexical items such as, for example, mate or fellow. In 
addition, DSSPIL notes that words for ‘husband’ are most commonly formed 
out of those originally meaning ‘man’. On the other hand, DSSPIL claims that 
probably in every I.E. language the word for ‘man’ may be used for ‘husband’ 
at least in colloquial or vulgar speech, as it is true even in Mod. E. ‘my man’. 
Beyond doubt, the fact clearly gives additional evidence to the bi-directionality 
of semantic change and its pragmatic conditioning.   
Also, the data from other languages seems to indicate that there are close 
ties between the conceptual domains MAN/MALE HUMAN BEING and 
HUSBAND/MALE SPOUSE. For example, the Polish counterpart of Mod.E. husband 
is mąż and in O. Pol. its original meaning was ‘man’ whereas Serbian muž, just 
like Dutch and Swedish man may refer to both ‘man’ and ‘husband’. To take 
another example, Spanish marido derives from Lat. maritus ‘husband’, which 
originated from Lat. mas/maris ‘man, male’. Notice also that the meaning 
‘husband’ was developed by Latvian virs clearly related to Lat. vir ‘man, 
husband, hero, warrior, soldier’.  
We may hypothesise that the shift in meaning originates in a singular 
event where the speaker sets up a frame of reference in which the conceptual 
domain HUSBAND/MALE SPOUSE and the lexical item associated with it is 
projected onto the conceptual domain MAN/MALE HUMAN BEING. Because of 
these inferences, a new sense becomes invited. The semantic structure of the 
newly emerged sense thread develops a structure of its own although sharing 
many of its conceptual elements with the input spaces from which it was 
integrated. The hybrid may continue its evolution in the direction of the target 
domain and – with the passage of time – its semantic structure becomes fully 
entrenched within the new concept. It seems that the process is possible because 
the speaker conceptualises the entities in the current frame of reference as 
comparable and integrates them into one. 
Since the two conceptual domains, that is HUSBAND/MALE SPOUSE and 
MAN/MALE HUMAN BEING, seem to be closely related conceptually, their 
integration is a natural consequence of overlapping semantic structures. Notice 
that being a husband presupposes being a man and every unmarried man can 
be perceived as a potential husband. Notice that this semantic change is a 
gradual process where one entity is conceptualised in terms of another. It starts 
at the pragmatic level where it assumes the form of inferencing and its 
conventionalisation may take place in several stages. As a result, one can hardly 
draw any sharp distinction between the ad hoc usage of a word in a new 
meaning and polysemy, on the one hand, and partial and full semantic change, 
on the other. Therefore, many near-synonyms of man may only contextually be 
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used in the sense ‘husband’, e.g. Mod. Pol. mężczyzna ‘man, male human being’ 
may be on some occasions contextually applied to ‘husband’.4 In some cases the 
two meanings are complementary, e.g. Lat. vir, Mod. G. Mann, meaning both 
‘man, male human being’ and ‘husband’, while in others one of the senses can 
only be traced in the word’s etymology, e.g. O. N. verr ‘husband’ and Russian 
муж [muž] ‘husband’.  
In this context, the question arises why a process that starts as such a 
subjective, context-induced and ephemeral phenomenon should be so 
widespread across languages. The answer to the problem seems to be 
ultimately grounded in human cognition and, therefore, the panchronic 
dimension of the semantic change can only be explained with reference to the 
cognitive processes taking place in our minds irrespective of time and place. As 
indicated by Traugott and Dasher (2002: 25), the implicatures/inferences 
causing polysemisation and leading to semantic change are “both cognitive 
(information-related) and communicative/rhetorical (arising out of purposeful 
negotiation between speaker and addressee)”.  
The O.E. wer/were is a cognate with the Lat. vir and both lexical items – 
O.E. wer and Lat. vir – are primarily associated with the sense thread ‘man, male 
human being’. As shown by the quotations below, the O.E. wer often occurs 
next to wif ‘woman’ which proves its central position as an O.E. synonym of 
man.  The O.E. wer is also related to O.Fris., O.Sax., O.H.G. wer, O.N. and O.N. 
verr, Goth. wair, O.Ir. fer (Gaelic fear), Lithuanian vyras, Skt. vira ‘man, hero’. The 
O.E. wer used in the sense ‘man, male human being’ can be illustrated with the 
following citations extracted from the OED: 
c900  if oxa ofhnite wer oððe wif.  
c1250 And on ðe sexte hundred er Wimmen weltenweres mester.  
 
Although the second context given above is the last attestation of wer/were 
in the original meaning ‘man, male human being’, the remnants of the sense can 
still be traced in some compounds such as, for example, Mod.E. werewolf ‘man 
who was capable of transforming himself into a wolf’, were-jaguar ‘in Olmec 
mythology, a creature partly human and partly feline’, and also wergeld, whose 
last attestation comes from the late 19th century, meaning ‘the price set upon a 
man according to his rank, paid by way of compensation or fine in cases of 
homicide and certain other crimes to free the offender from further obligation 
or punishment.’ In most of the compounds, however, such as wer-had ‘male 
sex’, wer-ðeod ‘nation’, werbeam ‘warrior’, folcwer ‘man’, wer was either replaced 
by man in the Mid.E. period or the form disappeared entirely. 
Another meaning developed by wer/were –‘husband’ – appears at the same 
time as ‘man’ which prompts that the two senses were interrelated. The 
                                                             
4 For example, in the context of this Polish sentence: Mój mężczyzna wyjechał do pracy w Chicago. 
‘My man/husband has gone to work in Chicago’. 
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meaning ‘husband’ is also well documented in the OED, for example in the 
following historical material: 
c893  Heora wif..sædon..hie him woldon oðerra wera ceosan.  
c1275  Go and clepe %ine were and cume% hider y-mene.  
 
Historical evidence shows that the word wer/were functioned as the most 
important lexical item to express the sense ‘husband’ until it was replaced by 
the borrowing from O.N. husbondi ‘master of the house’. Blair (1956) accounts 
for the lexical change by the fact that when the Norsemen settled in Anglo-
Saxon England, they would often take Anglo-Saxon women as their wives. It 
was then only natural to refer to the husband using the Norse form for the 
concept meant, and to refer to the wife with her Anglo-Saxon designation, wif  
‘woman, wife’.  
The use of wer/were in the sense ‘husband’ is also attested by the semantics 
of some morphologically related O.E. derivatives such as, for example, werleas 
‘without a husband’ or werlic ‘marital’. In the O.E. alliterative poetry, on the 
other hand, wer acquires the sense ‘hero, warrior’ which can be interpreted as a 
natural consequence of the conceptual overlapping between the conceptual 
domains MAN/MALE HUMAN BEING and WARRIOR/SOLDIER. The conceptual ties 
between the two domains can be additionally illustrated with the related 
collective noun wered which, according to CASD, developed the sense ‘band, 
company, throng, multitude’, but also the specific ‘army, troop, legion’.5 
Likewise, the etymology of Mid.E. heme seems to be parallel in many 
respects to the semantic history of husband. The word heme is derived from the 
O.E. ham ‘home’ and its original meaning was ‘householder’ before it became 
generalised and started to be applied in the sense ‘man, male human being’ 
which may be illustrated with the following OED quotations:  
a1250  For children gromes heme and hine Hi %enche% alle of %ire pine.  
a1327  An heme in an herygoud with honginde sleven.  
 
Mod. E. husband, on the other hand, continues the late O.E. form husbonda, 
where hus means ‘house’ and the meaning of bonda, a cognate of O.N. bondi, is 
presented in the OED as ‘peasant owning his own house and land, freeholder, 
franklin, yeoman’. Hence, the original meaning of husband was ‘the master of a 
house, the male head of a household’ which is shown in the following OED 
material:  
c1000 Ne sitte ,e on %am fyrme~stan setlum %e læs %e..se husbonda [Hatton MS. husb
unde] hate %e arisan.  
a1240 4e husebonde, %at is wit, warneð his hus.  
                                                             
5 This may be evidenced by the following OED quotations:  
    971 Ac se hea%rym %æs Godes hades %æm englicumweorodum simle ondweard wæs.  
    c1000  Ealle %as %ing se hælend spræc mid bi,-spellum to %amweredum.  
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Another sense of husband, that links the word to the conceptual domain 
OCCUPATION/PROFESSION, developed in the Mid. E. period when the word was 
used to refer to ‘cultivator, tiller, farmer, husbandman’ as demonstrated in the 
OED illustrative quotations: 
c1220  Fox is hire to name..husebondes hire haten, for hire harm dedes. 
c1330  Do com..burgeis & merchant, & knyght & squiere..hosbond & sergant, & tak of     
%am homage.  
 
Also, the OED provides evidence that husband was used in the sense 




6. SEMANTIC CHANGE AS A SHIFT IN CONTEXTUALISATION 
Meaning variation may result, or – to put it more adequately – primarily does 
result from the inherent properties of meaning itself such as plasticity, 
flexibility and context-dependency, which are caused by semantic 
underspecification, or the fact that the full semantic potential of a lexical item is 
never made use of. Consequently, the meaning of a word varies depending on 
the context or – to put it differently – becomes contextually flexible and 
depends on the hearer’s interpretation. Take, for example, the sentence Johnny’s 
a good reader that means one thing in a first grade schoolroom, but quite another 
reading is imposed by the context of a fifth grade schoolroom and – 
understandably – something utterly different in a school of declamation. 
Similarly, a given linguistic form may call forth different responses from 
different hearers involved in the process of communication. A description of 
good food may make a healthy and hungry man say Splendid! while a dyspeptic 
may say How unpleasant! and one who has just eaten his meal may refrain from 
saying anything at all.  
When various contextualisations of the lexical item goldenrod are analysed, 
one can see that the word means one thing to an artist, another to a careful 
farmer and still another to a hay-fever patient. All of them pay attention to 
different kinds of context-induced inferences. To take a somewhat more 
complex case, notice that the word shoe tends to mean one thing to a labourer, 
or to a soldier, and something entirely different to a dancer; one thing to a man 
and another to a woman, one thing to a mender of shoes and another to the 
owner of a shoe factory, something else to the operator of shoe-making 
machinery or to a retail salesman. In more technical terms, from the meaning 
                                                             
6 The use is illustrated with the following OED quotations: 
1545  A good grounde..well husbanded bringeth out great plentie of byg eared corn.  
1586 That his majesties..revenues [be] well husbanded and looked unto.  
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potential of a word like horse, through different kinds of contextualisations we 
caneither activate the image of a ‘prototypical horse’, or an ‘ideal horse’, or an 
image of what is known as a ‘stereotypical horse’. The three cases of shifts in 
contextualisation mentioned here are all examples of operations that can be 
triggered by a single word. Nevertheless, these nuances of meaning are in no 
way confined to any of the classes named. Thus, both farmers and victims of 
hay fever may look at goldenrod in the artistic way. Similarly, soldiers or 
labourers may observe the shoes of a professional dancer and some males may 
be as much interested in women’s shoes as the women themselves. Apart from 
this, meaning underspecification or vagueness7 may also lead to shifts in 
semantic emphasis and – as the result of this – bring about semantic change. 
And so, Mod. E. knave – a cognate of Mod. G. Knabe – continues O.E. cnapa/cnafa 
‘male child, boy’, as shown in the following OED quotations: 
a1050  Na ,edafenað %am se to fulfremednysse ho,að, gamenian mid cnafan [L. cum pa
rvulo].  
1000 Syle mihte cnafan %inum [L. puero tuo].  
 
The fact that boys frequently entered the service of a lord or master gives 
an extralinguistic explanation for the following development which took place 
in the O.E. and Mid. E. period ‘boy’ > ‘boy servant’ > ‘servant irrespective of 
age’. In other words, many boys, especially those of low condition, were 
employed as servants and the emphasis on this nuance of the basic meaning in 
the form of an invited inference rendered the word a new sense ‘servant’ 
evidenced in the following Mid. E. language material quoted after the OED: 
a1225 4e kokes knaue, %et wassheð %e disshes iðe kuchene.  
a1300  He bad cum wit him knaues tua.  
 
Again, in terms of extralingustic conditions servants and serfs do not 
necessarily like the treatment meted out to them by their masters and, therefore, 
they either act in a way that their masters perceive as insolent or – in extreme 
cases – some servants take to deceitful and dishonourable practices and become 
rascals. In the 13th century, there appears a new sense of knave which, compared 
to the earlier ‘servant irrespective of age’, shows a further strengthening of the 
                                                             
7 For Waldron (1979) broadly-understood vagueness is considered as one of the most 
important conditions of changes in meaning. The author distinguishes several types of 
vagueness. One is ambiguity, where there is some hesitation on the part of the interpreter 
between two or more meanings of a lexical item. The next type, viz., generality, is characteristic 
of those things, acts and facts which have very few limiting criteria and are therefore wide in 
application, for example, case, huge, thing. Another type of semantic vagueness is variation 
among different speakers as to the precise definition of certain lexical items. This holds 
particularly true of moral and political terms such as justice, wicked, right, etc. Finally, Waldron 
names indeterminacy. What is meant here is the fact that no decision has ever been taken as to 
the precise limits of application of such terms as shoulder, morning, evening and normally no one 
feels it to be necessary to specify such limits. 
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pejorative load, from socially negatively tinted ‘servant’ to morally disreputable 
‘base and crafty rogue’. Again, one could say that the emphasis put on that part 
of the word’s semantic structure, generated as an inference, was responsible for 




Meaning is always in flux. The semantic development of the lexical items 
discussed above shows that the boundary line between the conventionalised 
sense alteration and polysemy is vague and the meaning variation is to be 
treated as a timeless phenomenon initiated by pragmatic devices such as 
inferencing. In all the examples of invited inferencing cited here the claim is 
that the chief cognitive mechanisms underlying the changes include conceptual 
metaphors, metonymy as well as conceptual blending. Thus, Traugott’s IITSC 
fully corresponds to Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002: 321) idea of brain as “a 
bubble chamber of mental spaces” where meaning receives various contextual 
configurations. The interconnectedness of conceptual domains and the ease 
with which particular words change their meaning from, for example, ‘man’ to 
‘husband’, ‘warrior’ to ‘man’ or ‘hero’, proves that mental spaces are formed all 
the time from old ones and inferences are constantly being generated from new 
contexts. The prototypicality of some patterns of semantic change, like those 
sketched in this study, stems from the fact that meaning transformations are 
pragmatically driven and cognitively verifiable and – as such – are universally 
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